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ABSTRACT
Over the last seven decades, there has been a proliferation of international
tribunals. Yet, they have not received unanimous approval, raising questions
about their legitimacy. A legitimate international tribunal is one whose authority
to adjudicate international disputes is perceived as justified. Using the case
study of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), this Article highlights the
three criteria that should be considered in assessing the legitimacy of an
international tribunal, which include legal, sociological, and moral elements. It
also contends that the I.C.J. cannot claim “full” legitimacy if any of these
components are missing in its decisions. The Article further suggests that the
legitimacy of the I.C.J. has a dynamic nature, as litigating parties may
continually change their perception of the court’s authority at any time before,
during, or after the judicial process. The Article equally describes other factors
that can contribute to maintaining the international court’s legitimacy,
including fairness and unbiasedness, sound interpretation of international legal
norms, and transparency.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal function of international and regional courts is to adjudicate
disputes between States or between States and individuals.1 International
judicial bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), can issue
rulings on various issues, including the scope of protection of human rights, the
reparations due to victims of human rights abuses, the legality of armed
aggression, the delimitation of international borders, and the conditions in which
the use of force can be authorized or forbidden, among other matters.2
In June 1999, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) filed a series of
complaints to the I.C.J. and claimed, among other things, that Burundi, Rwanda,
and Uganda committed armed aggression against its territory.3 The DRC also
argued that the armed forces of those countries perpetrated massive and serious
human rights violations against its populations.4 Through this proceeding,
known as the Cases Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo, some parties questioned the I.C.J.’s legitimacy to adjudicate this
dispute.5 In particular, Burundi and Rwanda challenged the authority of the I.C.J.
to adjudicate this dispute, positing that some provisions of the Statute of the
I.C.J. and the U.N. Charter may preclude the I.C.J. from examining the merits
of the DRC’s claims.6
In its 2002 decisions in the Cases Concerning the Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo: DRC v. Rwanda and DRC v. Burundi, the I.C.J.
dismissed the charges against Burundi and Rwanda for their involvement in the
armed aggression and violations of human rights in the DRC.7 The I.C.J. based

1
U.N. Charter art. 92. (“The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.”) See U.N. Charter
Ch. XIV; see also Statute of the I.C.J., art. 36, 18 Apr. 1946.
2
Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 62 (2013).
3
See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Communication 227/99, African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 85–89 (May 2003), https://www.globalhealthrights.
org/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v-burundi-rwanda-and-uganda/.
4
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 116, ¶ 8 (Dec. 19); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.].
5
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002), (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 126–28 (Feb. 3).
6
Daniel M. Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 605 (1999).
7
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. ¶¶ 126–28. See generally Statute of the I.C.J., 18 Apr. 1946.
The cases concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (DRC v. Burundi, DRC v. Rwanda, and DRC
v. Uganda) relates to the same events, same issues and same parties. They were, however, brought before the
I.C.J. against each respondent State upon different grounds of the Court’s jurisdiction. This made it look like
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its rulings on the fact that neither of these two countries had recognized its
compulsory jurisdiction.8 Yet, in its December 2005 judgment on the same
claims against Uganda,9 the I.C.J.: (1) held that Uganda violated human rights
in the DRC due to acts of killing and torture committed by its army against the
Congolese populations; (2) compelled the respondent State to cease military
activities;10 and (3) required Uganda to make financial reparations to the DRC
on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.11 As of June 2020, no
financial compensation has been provided.12
This Article examines the legitimacy of international tribunals. The analysis
of the legitimacy of the international courts, such as the I.C.J., is essential given
the importance of the matters that the litigating parties submit to them. The
I.C.J.’s legitimacy may have some implications on litigating parties’ voluntary
compliance with its judgments13 or impact human behavior by transforming
litigating parties’ attitudes on refraining from violating international laws in the
future.14 Not surprisingly, the decisions rendered by a tribunal considered

three distinct cases. The jurisdiction of the I.C.J. over the DRC’s claim in DRC v. Uganda case was established
under Article 36(2) of the I.C.J. Statute because both the DRC and Uganda had unilaterally consented to the
Court’s jurisdiction. See Uganda, Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in Conformity with Art. 36, ¶ 2 of the Statute of the I.C.J. Oct. 3, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 6946. The
DRC recognized the I.C.J. jurisdiction in 1989, and Uganda did so in 1963 with the condition of reciprocity. Yet
concerning Burundi and Rwanda, neither State had recognized the I.C.J. to exercise jurisdiction in all cases, nor
acceded to a treaty providing for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction in specified circumstances. Consequently, the I.C.J.
concluded that claims against Burundi and Rwanda were inadmissible because the countries did not accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Andrew Mollel, International Adjudication and Resolution of Armed
Conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes: A Focus on the DRC Conflict, 1 J.L. CONFLICT RESOL. 10, 19 (2009); see
also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 128.
8
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 221.
9
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] ¶ 98; see also Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 221.
10
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 221.
11
Id.
12
In a press release dated November 13, 2019, The Hauge notes:
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has
decided to postpone the public hearings on the question of reparations in the case concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
which had been due to take place between Monday 18 and Friday 22 November 2019. The Court
made its decision taking into consideration the joint request submitted by the Parties by a letter
dated 9 November 2019.
See International Court of Justice, Press Release, No. 2019/48, 13 November 2019, available at: https://www.icjcij.org/en/press-releases/2010-2019/desc.
13
James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice and Political
Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 470 (1989).
14
Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 307, 308 (2009).
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illegitimate by the involved parties are more likely to be unaccepted, unenforced,
and without impact on society than the decisions issued by a tribunal that has
more legitimacy.15
This Article argues that a legitimate tribunal is one whose authority is
justified and accepted.16 It suggests that three criteria should be considered in
assessing the I.C.J.’s legitimacy, including legal, sociological, and moral
elements.17 This Article further posits that the I.C.J. could not claim “full”
legitimacy if any of these three components of legitimacy are missing in its
decisions. In fact, the court’s judgment could be legally correct and legitimate
(if it was issued in accordance with the applicable laws) while at the same time
being morally and sociologically illegitimate if that decision was morally
unjustifiable and socially rejected.18 This Article also contends that the
legitimacy of the I.C.J. has a dynamic nature because litigating parties can
change their perception of the I.C.J.’s authority before, during, or after the
judicial proceedings.19 This Article further highlights the factors that can
contribute to maintaining the I.C.J.’s legitimacy, such as fairness and
unbiasedness, sound interpretation of international legal norms, and
transparency.20 In doing so, this Article underlines the relationship between the
I.C.J.’s legitimacy and State compliance with the I.C.J. decisions through
addressing the question as to whether the State’s non-compliance could imply
the State’s rejection of the I.C.J.’s legitimacy. In this regard, this Article
theorizes that the States’ non-compliance with the I.C.J. judgments can be linked
to numerous variables, such as the lack of precision within the court’s ruling; the
politicization of the post-adjudicative phase, coupled with the lack of sanctions
against defaulting States; and the issue of State sovereignty, coupled with the
nonexistence of a judicial enforcement mechanism at domestic levels.21 Yet, the
15

Gibson, supra note 13, at 470.
Grossman, supra note 2, at 65, 85.
17
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–1801 (2005);
see generally U.N. Charter; Statute of the I.C.J., 18 Apr. 1946; see also Bodansky, supra note 6, at 605;
Grossman, supra note 2, at 64.
18
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002), (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 128 (Feb. 3); see PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 106 (2002);
see also PABLO DE GREIFF, THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 593 (2006) (explaining that all people have a
moral obligation to repair the negative consequence of their conduct even if they were not at fault in causing it).
See generally Statute of the I.C.J. art. 36, 18 Apr. 1946.
19
Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
107, 117 (2009).
20
Id. at 115.
21
See Roger-Claude Liwanga, From Commitment to Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of
African Human Rights Bodies, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 100, 135–38 (2015); Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement
of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539, 540
16
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Article concludes by claiming that even if each of these variables for noncompliance may not have a direct connection with the rejection of the I.C.J.’s
legitimacy, each of them exposes the weakness of a tribunal that is unable to
enforce its decisions; thereby revealing the contestation of the I.C.J.’s justified
authority.
This Article is structured as follows: Section I will examine the concept of
legitimacy of international tribunals, explore the criteria of assessing the I.C.J.’s
legitimacy, and survey the factors contributing to the I.C.J.’s legitimacy. Section
II will analyze the enforcement of the I.C.J.’s decisions and respond to the
question of whether partial compliance or non-compliance with the I.C.J.’s
judgments by State parties amounts to rejection of the I.C.J.’s legitimacy.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY OF THE I.C.J.

This Section responds to questions such as: What is a legitimate
(international) tribunal? What makes one (international) tribunal more
legitimate than another? What are the indispensable elements making an
international tribunal to be perceived as less legitimate in the eyes of litigating
parties and/or those whom its decision would impact? Does the I.C.J. meet the
criteria of a legitimate judicial institution?
A. Definition
Before seeking to understand what a legitimate international tribunal is, it is
important to understand the meaning of the term “legitimacy.” There is no single
definition of the term “legitimacy.”22 Etymologically, the term “legitimacy”
derives from the Latin word “legitimare,” which means to “make lawful, declare
to be lawful.”23 The term “legitimacy” refers to the condition of being in
accordance with law and principle or being justifiable24 and denotes the
“justified authority” of an institution that acts according to its assigned

(1995); Pammela Q. Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97,
109 (2012); CONSTANZE SCHUILTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
39 (2004); Richard F. Oppong & Lisa C. Niro, Enforcing Judgments of the International Courts in National
Courts, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 344, 346 (2014); see also Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491, 506, 522–23
(2008); Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), Judgement, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78 (June
15, 1939).
22
Bodansky, supra note 6, at 600; see also Fallon, supra note 17, 1794–1801.
23
See Legitimate, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=
legitimate.
24
See Legitimacy, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/legitimacy; see also WEBSTER’S NEW
COMPACT DESK DICTIONARY AND STYLE GUIDE 277 (2002).
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function.25 For example, the authority of the parliament is to make laws, the
authority of the government is to execute the laws, and the authority of the court
is to adjudicate disputes, and thus, they are viewed as employing these functions
legitimately.26 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “legitimate” in many ways,
including “lawful,” “genuine”, “valid,” and, in the case of children, “born of
legally married parents.”27 Thus, one can see already that legitimacy takes many
forms and is not only something that is compliant with the law but also seen as
socially acceptable.
In the context of courts:
Judicial legitimacy derives from the belief that judges are impartial
and that their decisions are grounded in law, not ideology and politics.
Often in sharp contrast to other political institutions (such as
legislatures), courts are respected—indeed often revered—because
their decisions are viewed as being principled rather than motivated by
self-interest or partisanship.28

As to international tribunals specifically, “a legitimate international
adjudicative body [is] one whose authority is perceived as justified . . . A
legitimate international court or tribunal must possess some ‘quality that leads
people (or states) to accept [its] authority . . . because of a general sense that the
authority is justified.’”29 Often, it is not just one quality but various qualities,
that make an institution legitimate. As such, it is clear that the concept of
“international tribunal legitimacy” is likely multidimensional rather than mono
dimensional.
B. Dimensions of the Legitimacy of the I.C.J.: The Legal, Moral, Sociological
Viewpoints
1. Legal Legitimacy
The legal legitimacy of an institution relates to the legal norms that establish
that institution.30 The legal legitimacy of the I.C.J. emanates from the I.C.J.’s
Statute and the U.N. Charter that State parties to the United Nations have
25
For Daniel Bodansky, “‘legitimacy’ refers to the justification of authority” and “‘legitimate authority’
simply means ‘justified authority.’” See Bodansky, supra note 6, at 601–02.
26
Id.; see also Grossman, supra note 2, at 64.
27
Legitimate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
28
James Gibson, Delmar Karlen, & Brian Smentkowski, Court, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/court-law.
29
Grossman, supra note 19, at 115.
30
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1794.
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accepted.31 States recognize the legal legitimacy of the I.C.J. by ratifying the
U.N. Charter establishing the I.C.J. and consenting to the I.C.J.’s compulsory
jurisdiction32 to adjudicate the disputes involving them.33 Article 36 of the
Statute of the I.C.J. stipulates that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a.
b.
c.
d.

the interpretation of a treaty;
any question of international law;
the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation;
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.34

The I.C.J.’s ability to proceed is based solely on the consent of the State parties
that submit themselves to the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the Court.35 Once a
31
U.N. Charter art. 92 (“[t]he International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.”). All U.N. State
Members are de facto parties to the I.C.J. Statute. See id. Yet, States that are not U.N. members may become
parties to the I.C.J. Statute on conditions determined by U.N. General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the U.N. Security Council. See id. art. 93.
32
Article 36, ¶¶ 3–6 of the I.C.J. Statute emphasizes the following:

3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity
on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute,
to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the
period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by
the decision of the Court.
The I.C.J.’s contentious proceeding is solely based on the consent of the State parties that submit themselves to
the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the Court. Once a State has given its consent recognizing the I.C.J.’s
compulsory jurisdiction, that State should subject itself to the Court’s jurisdiction. See generally id.
33
Grossman, supra note 19, at 112.
34
Statute of the I.C.J. art. 36, 18 Apr. 1946.
35
See generally Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. JUST.:
DECLARATIONS, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations.
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State has given its consent recognizing the I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction, that
State should subject itself to the Court’s jurisdiction.36 The legal legitimacy of
the I.C.J. is limited by the scope of its mandate as defined by the legal norms
that created it,37 meaning that the I.C.J. would become legally illegitimate if it
stopped acting in compliance with those legal norms.38
2. Moral Legitimacy
The moral dimension of legitimacy entails that an institution is legitimate
when its actions are morally justifiable or respect-worthy.39 A decision of the
tribunal can be legally correct (having legal legitimacy) while at the same time
being morally illegitimate if that decision is morally unjustified.40 This is
illustratively the 2006 case of the I.C.J., which, while correctly applying its
Statute in DRC v. Rwanda,41 dismissed the charges against Rwanda for its
involvement in violations of human rights in the DRC (including destruction of
property, mass killings and more) simply because Rwanda did not recognize its
compulsory jurisdiction.42 In this example, the I.C.J.’s decision was legally
legitimate because the I.C.J. Statute stipulates that the Court is only competent
to adjudicate cases brought by State parties that consent to its compulsory
jurisdiction.43 However, the I.C.J.’s decision was morally illegitimate because it
left numerous victims of human rights violations without reparations and with
no compensation for the physical, emotional and economic losses suffered.
Indeed, there is a moral dimension behind the idea of reparations to the extent
that any person is under a moral obligation to provide reparations for the
negative consequence of his/her conduct even if he/she was not at fault for

36
In light of Article 36 (2) of the I.C.J. Statute, “the States parties to the Statute of the Court may ‘at any
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court.’” Id. This implies that

[e]ach State which has recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has in principle the
right to bring any one or more other States, which have accepted the same obligation, before the
Court, by filing an application instituting proceedings with the Court. Conversely, it undertakes
to appear before the Court should proceedings be instituted against it by one or more other such
States.
Id.
37

Grossman, supra note 19, at 112.
Bodansky, supra note 6, at 605.
39
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1796.
40
Id.
41
See Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002), (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 128 (Feb. 3).
42
Id.
43
U.N. Charter art. 36. ¶¶ 1–2.
38
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causing it.44 In other words, reparation is a fundamental component of corrective
justice, in which the injurer should reverse or undo the harm caused to the
sufferer.45 From the moral and normative viewpoints, there is a relationship
between the injurers (Burundi and Rwanda and their armed forces) and the
sufferers (the human rights victims in the DRC), and such a relationship allows
the court to adequately fulfill its adjudicative function.46 The court is, therefore,
called to “intervene[] at the instance of the wronged party in order to undo or
prevent the wrongful harm.” 47 In the context of the I.C.J., the court would fail
to properly fulfill its task if it could not compel the wrongdoers to reverse the
injuries caused or to pay compensations for the harm suffered by the victims.
3. Sociological Legitimacy
An institution such as the I.C.J. is sociologically legitimate when the
population of the litigating States accepts or respects its authority.48 This
sociological dimension of legitimacy can be traced back to Max Weber, who
considered that “legitimacy signifies an active belief by citizens, whether
warranted or not, that particular claims to authority deserve respect or obedience
for reasons not restricted to self-interest.”49 This means, for example, that a
positive attitude of the population towards the decisions of the I.C.J. would
confer to the latter a popular legitimacy within international society.50 The
population’s acceptance of the international tribunal represents a foundation for
the effectiveness of the international tribunal’s rulings.51 “[T]he more an
institution is perceived as legitimate, the more . . . effective it is likely to be.”52
In addition to the I.C.J., there has been a proliferation of international and
regional tribunals, but their existence has not received unanimous approval.53
People have formulated various criticisms of international tribunals, including
labeling them as: supranational justice, culturally imperialistic justice, and
selective or biased justice.54
44

CANE, supra note 18, at 106; see also DE GREIFF, supra note 18, at 593.
Stephen Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).
46
Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 409 (1989).
47
Id. at 409–10.
48
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1795–96.
49
Id. at 1795.
50
Bodansky, supra note 6, at 601.
51
Id. at 603.
52
Id.; see also MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 31 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
53
See AFRICAN UNION, DECISION ON AFRICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 2, (Oct. 2013); see also Marlene Wind, Challenging Sovereignty? The USA and the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, 2 ETHICS & GLOB. POLICIES, 83, 84 (2009).
54
See David Kennedy, International Law and The Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17
45
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a. Supranational Justice and State Sovereignty
Sovereign States do not naturally accept an authority higher than
themselves.55 This is because “sovereignty is a script whose most important line
is that a [S]tate has the legitimate right to exercise authority. The [S]tate can
reject claims of authority and control that are made by external actors.”56 Some
proponents of the theory of state sovereignty have been reluctant to accept the
principle of having a supranational tribunal to autonomously adjudicate
international acts committed by a State’s nationals and officials.57 The
establishment of a supranational court (such as the I.C.J., the I.C.C., or others)
constitutes a violation of the fundamental “ideals of self-government and
popular sovereignty” of the States.58 For the critics of international tribunals, the
recognition of the authority of an international court would imply “the
irrevocable transfer of national sovereignty to an unelected and unaccountable
international institution.”59
b. Culturally Imperialistic Justice
The criticism of “cultural imperialism” is particularly used in the context
where international criminal law (perceived as a law of Western origin) is
imposed on the local cultural-legal practices of non-Western countries,
particularly developing nations.60 Certain American legal academics have
observed that “more than half the world’s population lives outside the law,” and
therefore there is a need “to spread American principles of justice, especially in
places that resist them.”61 Criticizing the “culturally paternalistic” nature of
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 113 (1996); STEPHEN KRASNER, PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND
POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 6 (2001); TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 8–9 (2009); Eric Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is
the International Court of Justice Biased, 34 J.L. STUD. 599, 600 (2005); see also Thomas Hensley, National
Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 568, 568 (1968).
55
Kennedy, supra note 54, at 113.
56
KRASNER, supra note 54, at 6.
57
Lee Casey & David Rivkin, The International Criminal Court vs. The American People, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1999/02/the-international-criminal-court-vsthe-american-people.
58
Id.
59
Id. In regard to the I.C.C., John Ashcroft (a former U.S Attorney General and Senator) stated that “[i]f
there is one critical component of sovereignty, it is the authority to define crimes and punishment. This court
strikes at the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from individual countries and giving
it to international bureaucrats.” Wind, supra note 53, at 84.
60
See KELSALL, supra note 54, at 8–9; see also SANDRA BURMAN & BARBARA HARRELL-BOND, THE
IMPOSITION OF LAW xiii (1979); PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURE STUDY OF LAW 46 (1999).
61
David Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism? Reinforcing Customary Justice
Through Collateral Review in Southern Sudan, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 2 (2010) (citation omitted) (
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international tribunals, a former prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(a U.N.-created hybrid tribunal) stated:
Our perspectives are off-kilter. We simply do not think about or factor
in the justice victims seek . . . We approach the insertion of
international justice paternalistically. . . . We consider our justice as
the only justice . . . We don’t contemplate why the tribunal is being set
up, and for whom it was established.62

To illustrate the cultural distinction between the Western-based international
justice system and the non-Western justice system, another commentator argued
that the Western justice system (particularly in the United States) is highly
oriented toward retributive justice and toward harsh penalties for crimes (such
as the application of capital punishment), while the “traditional” justice system
in non-Western countries (such as those in Africa) is oriented toward restorative
justice focusing on healing both the victims of crime and the community atlarge.63 Consequently, at the local level, one can perceive international tribunals
as illegitimate and reject their authority if the cultural values characterizing those
international tribunals are inconsistent with domestic practices and beliefs.64
c. Biased and Selective Justice
The critics of the I.C.J. have regularly accused it of being biased because its
judges render decisions based on political motivations65 rather than deciding
solely based on legal considerations.66 A 1968 study critiqued the I.C.J.’s judges

quotations omitted).
62
KELSALL, supra note 54, at 11 (quoting David Crane, former prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (an UN-created hybrid tribunal)).
63
Pimentel, supra note 61, at 4.
64
Id. Nevertheless, there is a need for nuance when distinguishing between the legal culture of African
countries and that of international tribunals. Of course, there exists a customary law in some legal systems in
Africa, including the DRC, whereby tribal chiefs can adjudicate disputes based on unwritten traditional law. See
Loi 82-020 du 31 mars 1982 portant Code de l’organisation et de la compétence judiciaires [Ordinance-Law 82020 of March 31, 1982 Relating to the Code of Organization of the Judicial Competence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 1, 1982, p. 39. According to Article
163 of the DRC Code of Organization of the Judicial Competence, the customary courts are maintained and
competent to adjudicate disputes based on customs until the installation of the Tribunals of Peace. Id.
At the same time, upon their independence, numerous African countries adopted the written legal
systems of their former colonial powers, which were either civil law or common law depending on whether the
countries were former French or British colonies, respectively. These written laws (from French civil law or
British common law) are the ones regularly used by African domestic courts to adjudicate local disputes. see
Sandra Joireman, Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J.
MOD. AFRICAN STUDIES 571, 571 (2001).
65
Posner & F.P. de Figueiredo, supra note 54, at 600; Hensley, supra note 54, at 568.
66
Posner & F.P. de Figueiredo, supra note 54, at 600–01.
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for demonstrating favoritism to their home countries’ interests based on a
content analysis of its voting patterns.67 A more recent empirical study on the
voting patterns of I.C.J. judges reached a similar conclusion on the lack of
judicial independence of I.C.J. judges in the decision-making process; the
researchers concluded that most of the I.C.J. judges vote in favor of the interests
of their home States which appointed them or in favor of States whose level of
wealth is relatively the same as that of their home States.68 According to the
research, I.C.J. judges align their votes with their own home country’s interest
eighty-five to ninety percent of the time.69 Illustratively, in DRC v. Uganda, the
I.C.J. authorized each litigating party to respectively appoint one judge ad hoc
by virtue of Article 31 of the I.C.J. Statute, as neither party had a judge of its
nationality on the bench.70 All the judges in this case were called to vote on
fourteen issues that were raised during the proceedings;71 the voting record
revealed that out of fourteen votes, the judge appointed by Uganda cast twelve
votes in favor of Uganda while the judge appointed by the DRC voted eleven
times in favor of the DRC.72
In summary, a legitimate international tribunal is one that: draws its
authority from a protocol or treaty establishing it; a tribunal that is accepted by
the international or regional community; and whose decisions are morally
justified and accepted by all parties. An international tribunal cannot claim “full”
legitimacy if any of these components are missing. A decision of an international
tribunal may be legally correct (having legal legitimacy) while being at the same
time unpopular (lacking social legitimacy) and morally unjustified (lacking
moral legitimacy).73 As it will be further elaborated in the upcoming sections, in
order to maintain its legitimacy, an international tribunal should at all times: (1)
be fair and unbiased; (2) interpret and properly apply the correct legal norms,
and; (3) be transparent in its functioning and decision-making processes.74 The

67

Hensley, supra note 54, at 568.
Posner & F.P. de Figueiredo, supra note 54, at 600–01.
69
Id. at 601.
70
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 116, ¶ 6 (Dec. 19).
71
Id. ¶ 345.
72
Id. Like the I.C.J., the I.C.C. is also accused of showing signs of partiality and being selective in
conducting investigations and prosecutions of international crimes; this criticism emanates principally from a
group of African countries. See MAX DU PLESSIS, TIVANIANA MALUWA, & ANNIE O’REILLY, AFRICA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (Chatham House 2013), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/International%20Law/0713pp_iccafrica.pdf.
73
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1796.
74
See generally Grossman, supra note 2, at 114.
68
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failure of an international tribunal to maintain full legitimacy would most likely
lead to parties’ non-compliance with its decisions.
C. Dynamism of the Nature of Legitimacy
The legitimacy of international tribunals has a dynamic nature as potential
litigating parties may change their perception of the tribunals’ legitimacy before,
during, and after the judicial proceedings.75 For instance, although Rwanda had
ratified the U.N. Charter,76 it had also refused to recognize the legitimacy of the
I.C.J. to adjudicate any present or future disputes that may involve it before the
dispute arose (a “pre-denial” of the I.C.J.’s legitimacy), which led to the I.C.J.’s
declaration of incompetence in DRC v. Rwanda.77 Likewise, in the Nicaragua v.
United States case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua,78 the United States also decided to withdraw its prior consent
to the I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction following the unfavorable position of the
I.C.J. towards it during the case.79 In this case, the United States had referred to
a peri-denial of the I.C.J.’s legitimacy.80
Similarly, in the context of the International Criminal Court (“I.C.C.”),
numerous African countries (including South Africa and DRC) have recognized
the legitimacy of the I.C.C. through their ratification of the Rome Statute that
established the I.C.C.81 Yet, South Africa and DRC changed their perception of
the I.C.C.’s legitimacy after the I.C.C.’s prosecution of Omar Al-Bashir (former
President of Sudan),82 Uhuru Kenyatta (President of Kenya), and William Ruto
75

Id. at 80.
See Member States, UNITED NATIONS: GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.un.org/en/member-states. Rwanda
became a member of the United Nations on September 18, 1962 following its ratification of the U.N. Charter.
77
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002), (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 13, 128 (Feb. 3).
78
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14 ¶ 10 (June 27).
79
See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Withdrawal From the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
ICJ, Dep’t St. Bull., Mar. 1985, at 63; United States: Letter to U.N. Secretary—General Concerning Non—
Applicability of Compulsory Jurisdiction of The International Court of Justice with Regard to Disputes with
Central American States, 23 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 670 (1984); see also Grossman, supra note 2, at 72.
80
United States: Letter to U.N. Secretary—General Concerning Non—Applicability of Compulsory
Jurisdiction of The International Court of Justice with Regard to Disputes with Central American States, supra
note 79.
81
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, I.C.C., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%
20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [hereinafter The States
Parties to the Rome Statute] (stating that the DRC and South Africa respectively ratified the Rome Statute April
11, 2002, and November 27, 2000).
82
Sascha-Dominick D. Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei, The African Union-ICC Controversy Before
the ICJ: A Way Forward to Strengthen International Criminal Justice?, 29 WASH. L. REV.. 247, 252, 258–59
(2020).
76
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(Deputy-President of Kenya).83 Indeed, South Africa and DRC had aligned their
positions with the philosophy of the African Union (a continental organization
regrouping African countries) that has implicitly “declared” the I.C.C. as an
“illegitimate tribunal” for compelling its State members not to collaborate with
the I.C.C. in arresting the sitting heads of States for international crimes they
have allegedly committed.84 And such an attitude of the State members of the
African Union can be understood as a “post-denial” of the I.C.C.’s legitimacy
because the same countries had previously commended the establishment of the
I.C.C.
The defiance of the States or individuals who have shifted their opinions of
the legitimacy of international tribunals raises two fundamental questions: (1)
under which conditions can a legally legitimate international tribunal still
continue being perceived as a legitimate tribunal?; and (2) what are the factors
contributing to an international tribunal’s legitimacy?
D. Factors Contributing to an International Court’s Legitimacy
Numerous factors contribute to the legitimacy of international tribunals,
including: fairness and unbiasedness, sound interpretation and application of
legal norms, and transparency.85
1. Fairness and Unbiasedness
Fairness and unbiasedness includes providing the disputing parties with an
equal possibility of having their cases heard during the procedural and
substantive stages of the adjudicative phase.86 Of course, the disputing parties
would be reluctant to approach an international or regional tribunal to rule over
their complaints if that tribunal had a reputation of lacking credibility in terms
of fairness and unbiasedness, meaning that a tribunal offers equal opportunity to

83
See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, ¶¶ 1, 2. (May 30,
2011); see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant
to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 2, 3 (Jan. 23, 2011).
84
AFRICAN UNION, DECISION ON AFRICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
2 (Oct. 2013). The African Union has accused the I.C.C. of being biased and targeting only African nationals.
As of December 2015, all the cases that are under investigation and prosecutions have connection with crimes
allegedly committed in African countries by African citizens, including heads of States. See DU PLESSIS,
MALUWA & O’REILLY, supra note 72, at 2; John Dugard, Palestine and the International Criminal Court:
Institutional Failure or Bias?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 563 (2013)
85
See generally Grossman, supra note 2.
86
Id. at 81.
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the parties to express their views at all stages of the adjudicative procedure.87 In
regards to the I.C.J., the court has clear rules of procedure describing how
litigating parties can exchange documents between themselves or submit their
oral and written opinions to the court before and during the proceedings.88 The
I.C.J.’s Rules of Procedure allow the litigating parties to jointly propose
modifications to the Court’s Rules, which should be approved by the I.C.J.89 The
legitimacy of the international tribunal is also linked to the personality of its
adjudicators who are required to be unbiased.90 The international tribunal may
be perceived as illegitimate if its judicial personnel (judges, registrar, and others)
are biased and thereby discourages potential parties from lodging their
complaints to the tribunal.91
This issue of unbiased judicial personnel of international tribunals is very
important, particularly in the context where some sitting judges of international
judicial bodies may be sympathetic to the interests of their home countries. 92
The I.C.J. Statute allows a litigating party, which does not have a judge of its
nationality on the bench, to choose a person of its nationality to sit as judge ad
hoc in that specific case; that chosen ad hoc judge can also participate in the
decision-making process in that case along with the other judges.93 It is more
likely that the judge that State X has chosen would be more responsive to the
interests of State X and be more biased against the other State party in that case.
Of course, one may argue that State X would not be confident with the decision
of the I.C.J. over the dispute opposing it against State Y if that decision was
taken with the participation of a judge of the nationality of the State Y with the
absence of a judge of the nationality of State X.94 Therefore, judges representing
the nationalities of both States are required to sit on the bench. This viewpoint
sounds valid, but it also contradicts the principle of judicial neutrality or
independence, which requires judicial officers to apply their own integrity while
performing judicial functions and to not be directly or indirectly influenced by
the litigating parties.95

87

Id. at 64.
See How the Court Works, I.C.J., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-court-works.
89
Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 6, art. 101.
90
Grossman, supra note 2, at 67–68, 78–79.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 78–79; see also Edith B. Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry,
in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123, 124 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
93
Statute of the I.C.J. art. 36, ¶¶ 2–3, 6, 18 Apr. 1946.
94
Judges Ad Hoc, I.C.J., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/judges-ad-hoc.
95
Roger-Claude Liwanga, Judicial Independence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Myth or Reality,
56 J. AFR. L. 194, 194–95 (2012).
88
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2. Sound Interpretation and Application of International Law
Another variable contributing to the legitimacy of the international tribunal
is sound interpretation and application of legal norms.96 The international
tribunal would be considered illegitimate if it did not correctly interpret
international laws and principles applicable in the specific dispute.97 Let us
assume that the principle of State international responsibility for human rights
violations requires that the State violator provide integral reparations to victims
to restore the status quo ante that prevailed before the commission of its illegal
conduct.98 If an international tribunal repeatedly and inconsistently interprets
this principle by requiring the State violator to offer partial reparations for its
wrongful acts, the parties may disagree and reject that tribunal’s judgments,
which are inconsistent with that principle of international law. Such a
disagreement with the tribunal’s judgments may translate into criticism and
discourage other potential parties from bringing their disputes to that tribunal
knowing that it often wrongly applies the legal norms and principles.99 In other
words, if an international tribunal regularly issues judgments which are not only
inconsistent with set laws and principles, but also do not correspond with the
interests of the parties, then that tribunal would cease to be considered as
legitimate.100
3. Transparency
The third element contributing to the legitimacy of an international tribunal
is transparency and infusion of democratic norms. There is a link between the
transparency and legitimacy of international tribunals to the extent that
transparency enables the litigating parties to ascertain whether the tribunal is fair
and unbiased and a good interpreter of specific legal norms.101 As a democratic
norm, transparency is also connected to legitimacy because it allows the parties
to assess to which degree an international tribunal is accountable.102 In other
words, an international tribunal is “transparent” when it permits the litigating
96

Grossman, supra note 2, at 103.
Id. at 134.
98
Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.17, at 47 (Sept. 13, 1928)
(“Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”). Int’l Law Comm’n Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 31, ¶¶ 1–2 (2001).
99
Factory at Chorzow, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), at 47.
100
Id.
101
Grossman, supra note 2, at 87.
102
Id. at 87, 91.
97
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parties and the public in the large sense to observe its functioning and its
decision-making process. That transparency can be illustrated through holding
public hearings, publishing the identities of judges and parties in the concerned
cases, and incorporating the decision’s reasoning, as well as the dissenting and
separate opinions of other judges.103 The justified authority of an international
tribunal can be questioned if that tribunal does not offer any possibility to
evaluate its decision-making process and/or the content of its decision.
II. STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE I.C.J.’S DECISIONS
AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COURT
A. Overview of Compliance
United Nations State Members are entitled to approach the I.C.J. to submit
their disputes for adjudication and receive a final and binding decision of the
court.104 Yet, nothing in the U.N. Charter or the Statutes of the I.C.J. guarantees
that the disputing parties will fully enforce a ruling issued by the I.C.J. regarding
their dispute.105
The question of compliance with the I.C.J.’s decisions is regulated by Article
94 of the U.N. Charter, which compels each State party to enforce the I.C.J.’s
judgment106 and defines “noncompliance” as a failure by a State party to perform
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment delivered by the I.C.J.107 In
other words, there is compliance with the I.C.J. decision when a disputing party
either carries out the actions required by the I.C.J. ruling or refrains from
carrying out actions that the I.C.J.’s ruling prohibits.108 Compliance implies the
“acceptance of the judgment as final, and reasonable performance in good faith”
of that legally binding obligation.109 Complying in good faith with the I.C.J.
103

Id. at 86, 94.
See U.N. Charter, art. 92 and 93(1).
105
ICJ STATS – Enforcement of ICJ Rulings, AMANDALA (Jan. 30, 2009), http://amandala.com.bz/news/
icj-stats-enforcement-of-icj-rulings/.
106
U.N. Charter, Ch. XIV, art. 94, ¶ 1 (“Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”).
107
Id. ¶ 2 (“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures . . . to give effect to the judgment.”).
108
Alexandra V. Huneeus, Compliance with International Court Judgments and Decisions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 6 (2013).
109
Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 435 (2004); see also Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 75, 79 (1998); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 17–22 (1995).
104
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decision requires the disputing party to give effect to the ruling without referring
to any superficial implementation of that ruling or otherwise circumventing it.110
Compliance with the I.C.J.’s decision can be catalogued into two categories:
the first type of compliance relates to compliance with the I.C.J.’s orders
compelling a concrete action from a disputing party, and the second type refers
to compliance with the I.C.J.’s remedial orders granting relief prior to a
substantive ruling.111 Of course, each disputing State party is free to choose its
own method of implementation of the I.C.J.’s judgment;112 yet any method of
implementation should not obligate the other party of the dispute who may
contest it.113 This could, in turn, lead to another dispute between the concerned
parties.114 Eric Posner’s paper on the decline of the I.C.J. revealed that only
twenty-nine percent of all cases adjudicated by the I.C.J. from 1986 to 2004,
were enforced by the parties involved.115 But how does one assess the level of
the disputing party’s compliance with the I.C.J.’s decisions?
B. Calculation of the State’s Compliance with I.C.J.’s Decisions
Assessing the state’s compliance with the I.C.J.’s decision would require one
to analyze: (1) the task(s) that the ruling compelled the disputing parties to
execute, and (2) the behavior of the disputing parties in executing the I.C.J.’s
ruling. Regarding the behavior of the disputing parties, one may observe if the
disputing party has: (a) completely not executed, (b) completely executed, or (c)
partially executed the I.C.J.’s decision. Partial execution can be subdivided into
three sub-groups: initiated, minimal, and intermediate executions.
1. Tasks Required by the Decision
As mentioned in the introduction, in its 2005 judgment in DRC v. Uganda,
the I.C.J. ruled that Uganda violated human rights in the DRC by acts of killing
and torture committed by its army against the Congolese populations.116
Therefore, the I.C.J. compelled Uganda to perform three specific tasks: (1) to

110

Id.
Huneeus, supra note 102 at 6.
112
SCHUILTE, supra note 21, at 30.
113
Id. at 29.
114
Id.
115
Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 11 (Univ. Chi. John M. Olin Program in
L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629341.
116
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 116, ¶ 221 (Dec. 19).
111
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immediately cease military activities,117 (2) to pay financial reparations to the
DRC on behalf of the victims of human rights violations, and (3) to support the
peace process in the DRC and the African Great Lakes region.118
2. Behavior of the Disputing Parties
The coding methodology to assess the behavior of the disputing parties in
enforcing each task, which is ordered by the I.C.J.’s ruling, ranges from 0 to 10
points. This means that a score of:









117
118

0 point signifies a Non-Execution (𝐸 ): This represents the status quo,
and the disputing party has not taken any action or any observable
measure to begin the implementation of the task as ordered by the court.
For instance, in the context of the immediate cessation of military
activities, 𝐸 would imply that Uganda has not taken any action to stop
the fighting, nor have removed its army from the territory of the Congo.
2.5 points means an Initiated Execution (𝐸 ): This represents some
observable measure of the beginning of the execution of the task,
meaning that the parties have established a date of the execution of the
task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of
the concerned task.
5 points signifies Minimal Execution (𝐸 ): This represents the
situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the
execution of the task, but these efforts are not enough for the concerned
task to be completed by the end of the established deadline given the
current pace of the process. For instance, in the context of the immediate
cessation of military activities, 𝐸 would imply that Uganda has ended
the combat but that at least seventy-five percent of its fighting soldiers
are still present in the territory of the Congo.
7.5 points implies an Intermediate Execution (𝐸 ): This represents the
situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the
execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be
completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace
continues. For instance, in the context of the immediate cessation of
military activities, an 𝐸 would indicate that Uganda has ended the
combat, but between twenty-five percent and seventy-five percent of its
fighting soldiers have left the territory of the Congo.
10 points implies a Complete Execution (𝐸 ): This represents the
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 221
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situation where the Uganda army has not only stopped fighting, but has
also removed all its soldiers and their weaponry from the territory of the
Congo.
In short, there are five levels of compliance with the I.C.J.’s decision,
namely: 𝐸 (0 points), 𝐸 (2.5 points)], 𝐸 (5 points), 𝐸 (7.5 points) and 𝐸 (10
points).
3. Overall Assessment of Uganda’s Compliance with the I.C.J.’s Decision
To calculate Uganda’s overall compliance with the I.C.J. decision, one can
compare the Achieved Execution Score (AES) obtained by Uganda to the
Expected Possible Score (EPS) that Uganda could obtain if it enforced the
court’s ruling. In other words, the EPS is the total expected points if all tasks in
the court’s ruling are fully implemented.
In light of the 2005 I.C.J. decision in DRC v. Uganda, the EPS is thirty points
(including ten points for the complete cessation of Uganda’s military
activities,119 ten points for the full payment of financial reparations to the DRC,
and ten points for the support of the peace process in the DRC and the African
Great Lakes region120).

119
120

Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 221.
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Table 1: Evaluation of Uganda’s Compliance with the I.C.J.’s Decision
Tasks to Be
Performed
(as by the
I.C.J.
Ruling)
Immediate
cessation of
military
activities
Payment of
financial
reparations
to the DRC
on behalf of
the victims
of human
rights
violations
Support of
the peace
process in
the region
Achieved
Execution
Score

Uganda’s Behavior as of June 2020
Complete
Execution
(𝑬𝒄 )

Intermediate
Execution
(𝑬𝑰 )

Minimal
Execution
(𝑬𝒎 )

Initiated
Execution
(𝑬𝒊 )

NonExecution
(𝑬𝟎 )

10

-----

----

---

----

----

----

----

2.5

----

Expected
Possible
Score
(out of
30)

7.5

20

Source: Authors’ estimation based on information relating to the current status of the
implementation of the ruling in the DRC v. Uganda case

Table 1 represents the evaluation of Uganda’s compliance with I.C.J.’s final
decision in DRC v. Uganda. The table indicates that Uganda has obtained an
overall score of twenty out of thirty (expected possible score) in terms of its
enforcement of the I.C.J. ruling in this case. This means that first, Uganda has
fully ceased the military activities in the territories of Congo as ordered by the
court (earning ten out ten points); second, since the I.C.J. ruling, Uganda has
been involved in numerous peace talks and initiatives in the DRC and the
African Great Lakes region121 despite being accused of still supporting rebel

121
See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. Rep. 116, ¶ 257 (Dec. 19). In this case, the DRC requested specific guarantees and assurances that
Uganda would not repeat its illegal conduct, and the I.C.J. noted that Uganda had an international obligation not
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groups operating in the DRC (earning it 7.5 out of 10 points);122 and third,
Uganda has not yet made financial payments to the DRC victims of human rights
abuses.123 However, Uganda has been discussing with the DRC government on
the amount of financial reparation to be paid.124 Because of the initiation of
discussion on the execution of that task, Uganda earns 2.5 points out of 10. In
other words, fifteen years after the I.C.J. decision in December 2005, Uganda
has only enforced about sixty-seven percent of the court’s final ruling, which
amounts to partial compliance.
One may argue that it was foreseeable that Uganda would not fully comply
with the final decisions of the I.C.J. as the country had repeatedly failed to
enforce numerous orders of the court during the jurisdictional stage of the
procedure. This led Judge Oda, who was one of the judges in DRC v. Uganda,
to warn that “the repeated disregard of the judgments or orders of the Court by
the parties will inevitably impair the dignity of the Court and raise doubt as to
the judicial role to be played by the Court in the international community.”125
Of course, Uganda is not the sole ligating State who either partially complies
or does not comply at all with the I.C.J.’s decisions. As mentioned above, only
twenty-nine percent of all decisions issued by the I.C.J. 1986 to 2004 were fully
enforced by the parties involved.126 At the regional level, there is a similar
observation as the rate of compliance with the binding decisions of regional
judicial bodies is equally low. For instance, research conducted by Hawkins and
Jacoby on States’ compliance with human rights bodies’ decisions revealed that
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ judgments has a full compliance
rate of six percent, an eighty-three percent partial compliance rate, and an eleven
percent non-compliance rate.127 Concerning the compliance with the European
Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) decisions, the study disclosed that: only
to repeat any wrongful acts based on the Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes Region
that it had signed. Id.
122
See Final Rep. of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo (2014), transmitted by
Letter dated 12 December 2013 addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant
to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/2014/42 (Jan. 23,
2014).
123
See I.C.J., Press Release, No. 2019/48, supra note 12.
124
Id.
125
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, 39 ILM
131, 132 (2000) (Declaration of Oda J); see Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent
Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EURO. J. INT’L L., 815, 819 (2008).
126
Posner, supra note 115, at 11.
127
Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and InterAmerican Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 25, 56 (2010); see also Liwanga, supra note 21,
at 133–34.
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fourteen percent of the ECHR’s verdicts on the right not to be tortured are
enforced by the concerned States; thirty-two percent of decisions on protection
of rights in detention are executed; forty percent of decisions against
discrimination are executed; and sixty percent of decisions on freedom of
expression are executed.128 Likewise, the rate of compliance with the decisions
of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights is unsatisfactory, as
only fourteen percent of “[S]tate parties comply fully and in timely fashion with
the recommendations of the African Commission” on Human and Peoples’
Rights.129
From Judge Oda’s aforementioned “warning statement” in DRC v. Uganda,
two fundamental questions are posed: why do States not comply with the
decisions of the I.C.J. despite formally recognizing its competence? And can
such non-compliance with the I.C.J.’s decisions be interpreted as rejection of the
I.C.J.’s legitimacy?130
B. Does a State’s Non-compliance Imply Rejection of an International
Tribunal’s Legitimacy?
There is no empirical research establishing that States parties failing to
comply with the I.C.J.’s decisions do so because they principally reject the
legitimacy of the I.C.J. In fact, States’ non-compliance or partial compliance
with international tribunals’ decisions (including the I.C.J.) is linked to
numerous variables, including:


128

The lack of precision within the court’s ruling: Despite its recognition of
the right of the DRC to compensation in DRC v. Uganda, the I.C.J. did not
adjudicate on the amount of reparation nor did it recommend the elements
to be taken into account while assessing the amount of compensation.131
The I.C.J. decided to leave the question of the payment of reparation to the
two parties to negotiate for resolving it132 while reserving to itself the right
to intervene in future proceedings if the parties were unable to settle

Liwanga, supra note 21, at 133–34.
See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2007); see also Deborah
Forst, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court: Limits and Ways Ahead, 7 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST.
L. 1, 1 (2013); Liwanga, supra note 21, at 133–34.
130
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, 39 ILM
131, 132 (2000) (Declaration of Judge Oda).
131
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 116, ¶ 17 (Dec. 19).
132
Id.
129
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reparations between them.133 Some may argue that the fact that the I.C.J.’s
failure to precise in advance the reasonable timeframe (within which the
negotiations between the DRC and Uganda should be conducted) might
have contributed to Uganda’s noncompliance with the payment of
reparation fifteen years after the Court’s final decision. Yet, some others
can also counterargue that it was appropriate justice for the I.C.J. to give
the parties the possibility to negotiate and consult experts for evaluating the
exact extent of the damages and determining the appropriate amount of the
reparation. This argument sounds valid. However, it should be noted that
the clear stipulation of the timeframe could have avoided the risk of lengthy
negotiations, which can delay the possibility for countless human rights
victims to receive their financial remedy in a timely manner, as seems to be
the case today.134 As a rectification of its 2005 oversight, the I.C.J.
appointed in 2020 independent experts to provide their opinion on the
DRC’s damage claims135 under Article 67(1) of the I.C.J.'s Rules of the
Court.136


The politicization of the post-adjudicative phase, coupled with the lack of
sanctions against defaulting States: Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter
provides: “If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice, the
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures . . . to
give effect to the judgment.”137 The enforcement of the I.C.J. decisions is
solely attributed to nonjudicial institutions rather than judicial institutions;
“This wording implies that the Security Council has a discretionary power
to either enforce or not enforce compliance with the I.C.J.’s decisions no

133

Id. at 260.
Judge Cançado Trindade, who filed a separate opinion on the I.C.J.’s 2020 decision to obtain an expert
opinion, underscored “the need to proceed promptly to the determination of reparations for the grave breaches
of the International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. The delays by the ICJ so far are
unacceptable to me.” See I.C.J., Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Armed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/116/11620200908-ORD-01-01-EN.pdf.
135
See Press Release, I.C.J. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
I.C.J. Press Release 2020/30 (Oct. 16, 2020).
136
Art. 67(1): “If the Court considers it necessary to arrange for an enquiry or an expert opinion, it shall,
after hearing the parties, issue an order to this effect, defining the subject of the enquiry or expert opinion,
134

stating the number and mode of appointment of the persons to hold the enquiry or of the experts, and
laying down the procedure to be followed. Where appropriate, the Court shall require persons appointed
to carry out an enquiry, or to give an expert opinion, to make a solemn declaration.” see I.C.J. Rules of
Court, art 67(1), 14 Apr. 1978.
137

U.N. Charter, Ch. XIV, art. 94, ¶ 2.
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matter whether the request of compliance was formally made by a State
party favored by the decision.”138 Additionally, this “means that the
enforcement of the I.C.J.’s decisions is not ‘automatic;’ instead, it is subject
to ‘political negotiation’ between State political leaders sitting at the
Security Council.”139


The issue of State sovereignty, coupled with the nonexistence of a judicial
enforcement mechanism at domestic levels: The low rate of enforcement of
international judgments may be partially due to the lack of involvement
and/or competence of the domestic courts in the post-jurisdictional stage of
international proceedings. This is because numerous domestic courts either
exclude or are reluctant to enforce the international tribunals’ judgments
based on the idea of reaffirming the “judicial sovereignty/autonomy” of the
national courts vis-à-vis the supranational courts, which are perceived as
trying to “impose” their decisions on local tribunals.140 For instance, in
Medellin v. Texas, a case concerning Jose Medellin, a Mexican national,
who challenged his conviction and sentencing to death for participating in
the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston by arguing the
state of Texas violated his rights under the 1963 U.N. Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations that the United States ratified.141 In this case, the
U.S. Supreme Court was approached to adjudicate the question as to
whether the U.S. Constitution requires domestic courts to honor the treaty

138

Liwanga, supra note 21, at 137.
Id. at 135–38. In terms of enforcement, the role of the I.C.J. is reduced to that of a “simple spectator”
dependent on political negotiation. Political negotiation at the Security Council level also raises the issue of
voting procedures.
139

According to Article 27 of the U.N. Charter, all decisions of the Security Council must be made
by an affirmative vote of nine of its fifteen members, which include the concurring votes of the
five permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) who
have the right to veto. This voting procedure creates the risk that, for political rather than legal
reasons, the Security Council would not be able to reach a decision enforcing compliance with
an ICJ’s judgment condemning one of its permanent members.
Id.; see, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U,S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Jun.
27); S.C. Res 18428 (Oct. 28, 1986). In this case, Nicaragua approached the Security Council to get enforcement
of the I.C.J.’s judgment rendered in its favor, after the United States failed to comply. Id. The United States, a
permanent member of the Security Council, argued that the I.C.J. lacked the jurisdiction or competence to
adjudicate and render decision on the matter. Id. The United States used its veto power, and no decision on
enforcing compliance with the I.C.J.’s judgment was reached by the Security Council. Id. See also Tanzi, supra
note 21, at 542; Saunders, supra note 21, at 109; SCHUILTE, supra note 21, at 39; Oppong & Niro, supra note
21, at 346.
140
Liwanga, supra note 21, at 146.
141
Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
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obligation of the United States by enforcing a decision of the I.C.J.142 In its
ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an I.C.J. judgment is not directly
enforceable as domestic law in the state court.143 The U.S. Supreme Court
also emphasized that an I.C.J. judgment “creates an international law
obligation on the part of the United States, but it is not automatically
binding domestic law because none of the relevant treaty sources [] creates
binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no such
legislation has been enacted.”144 Of course, seeking enforcement of
international tribunal decisions before the municipal courts can be an
avenue to increase the rate of States’ compliance with the international
judgments. This is because the domestic courts might not only be an
“efficient mechanism for the enforcement of I.C.J. decisions,” but also for
the implementation of international law in general.145 The use of domestic
courts to enforce decisions of international courts would also “enhance
individual rights by depoliticizing the post-adjudicative phase of
international litigation.”146

However, it should be noted that even if each of these variables for noncompliance does not have a direct link to the rejection of the I.C.J.’s legitimacy,
cumulatively they actually expose the problem of the perceived illegitimacy of
the I.C.J. By refusing to voluntarily comply with the I.C.J.’s decisions, the
litigating State parties effectively contest the justified authority of the Court. In
the context of the DRC v. Uganda case, the lack of total enforcement of the
I.C.J.’s judgment by Uganda also raises the problem of the “illegitimacy” of the
I.C.J. from the perspective of victims of human rights violations in the DRC.
Human rights victims, who are deprived of justice and reparations because of

142

Id.
Id. at 522–23.
144
Id. Another question concerning the enforceability of international judgments by domestic courts is
whether individuals (or any non-state actors) with interests in the implementation of decisions from international
human rights judicial bodies can approach the domestic courts of defaulting States for the enforcement of
judgments delivered in their favor. In Société Commerciale de Belgique (Socobel) v. Greek State, a private party
for whom the Belgian government had exercised diplomatic protection, sought to enforce before a Belgian
domestic court a judgment that had been rendered in its favor by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The Belgian Court refused to enforce that international decision, by ruling that “a party which, by definition,
was not admitted to the bar of an international court should be able to rely on a decision in a case to which it
was not a party.” RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 263
(2011) (ebook); see Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), Judgment, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
78 (June 15, 1939).
145
Liwanga, supra note 21, at 140–42; SCHUILTE, supra note 21, at 77; see also Richard F. Oppong,
Enforcing Judgments of the SADC Tribunal in the Domestic Courts of Member States, in MONITORING
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 121 (Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2010).
146
Liwanga, supra note 21, at 140–41.
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Uganda’s noncompliance, can question the usefulness of bringing their
complaints before the international or regional judicial bodies whose decisions
are not likely to be enforced by a State violator of human rights. Furthermore,
when a State refuses to comply despite having the ability to do so, that may also
indicate that it does not fully respect the authority of the I.C.J.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article was to explore the concept of the legitimacy of
international tribunals and examine the factors contributing to the perception of
the I.C.J.’s legitimacy. The I.C.J. cannot claim full legitimacy if any of the three
components of legitimacy is missing: legal, moral, and sociological legitimacy.
The legal legitimacy of the I.C.J. emanates from the U.N. Charter establishing
it. The I.C.J. is morally legitimate when its decisions are morally justified, and
it is sociologically legitimate when its decisions are accepted by the affected
communities and enforced by the concerned parties. Regarding the enforcement
of the I.C.J.’s decisions, this Article highlighted the frequent refusal of litigating
parties to voluntarily comply with international decisions. Such noncompliance
from the concerned parties may imply a contestation of the justified or legitimate
authority of the I.C.J.

